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organization and its environment in order to obtain sustainable com-
petitive advantage and long-term success.” (Allen and Gerras)
The book is well organized and presented in three parts: the inward 
face of strategy, the outward face of strategy, and the power of integra-
tion. The “3D” in the title is the author’s suggestion that strategy is best 
thought of and executed in three dimensions: systems, opponents, and 
groups. Understanding one’s own system is imperative to determining 
the existing and needed capabilities. Examining current and potential 
opponents’ systems as sources from which competitors generate their 
capabilities allows the targeting and disruption of opposing strategies. 
Leveraging one’s own stakeholder group adds resources to prosecuting 
a successful strategy. For each discussion of the strategic dimensions, 
Harrison provides practical examples to illustrate concepts and prin-
ciples in the application of his framework. Harrison’s concluding section 
offers a refreshing twist as the framework is applied to a prominent 
and persistent security threat to the United States today—al Qaeda. 
Rather than developing a US strategy against its foe, he uses the “3D” 
framework to examine the al Qaeda strategy and, in doing so, provides 
interesting insights.
Harrison appropriately establishes disclaimers and caveats in his 
preface and conclusion. Perhaps the most important is, “the general 
framework is intended to be used suggestively rather than dogmatically.” 
So there is a duality with the internal and external focus of strategy that 
requires balance—adapting the organization/enterprise to its environ-
ment as well as designing methods to shape that same environment to 
attain its goals and objectives.
This book is an effective primer on strategy. Harrison holds his 
own against several more cerebral and complex treatments of strategy 
and strategic thinking—he does not promise too much. Readers should 
be wary of any book about strategy and strategic thinking that is so 
compact, lest they think strategy is merely about determining ends, 
ways, and means. To paraphrase Clausewitz, “Everything in [strategy] is 
very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” Far from an easy read, 
Strategic Thinking in 3D is accessible, thought provoking, and pragmatic 
for a wide range of individuals who may wrestle with the challenges of an 
uncertain and competitive environment. The value in Harrison’s work is 
not that it provides answers but asks the questions that drive leaders and 
their organizations to explore factors which may have strategic effect 
and substantive impact—then enables the crafting of viable strategies.
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A dapting to surprise on the battlefield has been a challenge militar-ies have faced since the beginning of  history. In the progressively 
growing field of  scholarly literature pertaining to military innovation 
and adaptation, there are few works which convey the complexity and 
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difficulty of  military change as thoughtfully as On Flexibility. Written by 
Colonel Dr. Meir Finkel of  the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), On Flexibility 
provides an original and elegant theoretical framework for analyzing 
military adaptability, as well as offering practical recommendations for 
modern militaries to enable rapid recovery from battlefield surprise on 
the doctrinal, operational, and techno-tactical levels.
Finkel’s main thesis is that modern militaries must maintain a flex-
ible and adaptable doctrine and organizational culture to cope with 
inevitable battlefield surprise and the constantly changing operational 
environment. He convincingly makes his argument by elucidating seven 
historical case studies which pertain to doctrinal, operational, and 
techno-tactical aspects of warfare: four case studies exemplify successful 
recovery from surprise due to the flexibility of the military organization, 
and three case studies highlight military failure to recover from surprise 
due to inflexibility. These cases are drawn from select British, French, 
and German experiences in World War II, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 
and the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, and highlight the degree of 
organizational flexibility of each military and their ability or inability to 
“recover from battlefield surprise.
Finkel provides succinct definitions of technological and doctrinal 
surprise while also outlining sensible criteria for “successful recovery” 
from surprise on the battlefield, which, he notes, is not confined to the 
techno-tactical level of war. Using a graded criteria scale, successful 
recovery is defined as the military’s complete recovery and ability to 
devise a counterresponse; the next best response would be neutralizing 
the damage from surprise without devising a counterchallenge, followed 
by minimizing (but not neutralizing) damage caused by the surprise. 
“Failure” of recovery would be inability to minimize damage from 
the surprise. The theoretical framework also discusses various forms 
of flexibility present in military organizations: conceptual and doctri-
nal flexibility, organizational and technological flexibility, flexibility in 
command-and-control and cognition, as well as mechanisms for imple-
mentation of lessons learned.
Case studies of successful recovery are drawn from German experi-
ences in WWII dealing with the T-34 Soviet tank and the British chaff, 
and the IDF during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The case study focusing 
on IDF surprise to the Egyptian introduction of anti-tank weapons in 
the Sinai in the 1973 War is particularly compelling. The informal and 
improvisational organizational culture of the IDF fosters tenacity and 
promotes mission-command principles; armored corps commanders on 
the ground were able to adapt their tactics fairly rapidly (despite a lack 
of weapons diversity—a key enabler of flexible responsiveness). Hence, 
Finkel notes that IDF organizational culture and individual unit initia-
tive was of paramount importance.
Case studies of failure to recover from surprise are drawn from 
the slow British recovery from bouts with German armor, the French 
experience with the German blitzkrieg, as well as the Soviet campaign in 
Afghanistan. The Soviet failure to recover from surprise in low-intensity 
conflict (LIC) while engaged in Afghanistan against the mujahedeen is 
a relevant historical study of inefficient military learning during LIC. 
Soviet doctrinal dogmatism and a hierarchal command-and-control 
structure inhibited decentralized autonomy of soldiers and prevented 
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Soviet recovery from the surprise of its own ineffectiveness on the 
Afghan battlefield.
Given the timely nature and current focus on low-intensity conflict 
and counterinsurgency (COIN) by many military organizations, the 
book could have benefitted from additional case studies of military adap-
tation and recovery from surprise during LIC or COIN, which for the 
most part (with exceptions), has been absent from the broader military 
innovation literature until recently. As we know, adapting “under fire” 
was an immense challenge that confronted United States, British, and 
Israeli forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere, and further 
case studies could have provided additional relevant lessons for Western 
militaries that, in the present operational environment, are doctrinally 
and tactically focused on COIN and “hybrid” warfare.
Given that surprise is inevitable, Finkel’s solution for recovery lies 
in sensible and flexible force-planning and doctrine development, rapid 
techno-tactical adaptability, and officer education grounded in a military 
culture which promotes agile thinking. Col. Finkel’s own experiences and 
expertise as Director of the IDF Ground Forces’ Concept Development 
and Doctrine Department are evident, as he deemphasizes the ability 
to make accurate, “perfect” predictions based on intelligence, instead 
focusing on organizational and technological adaptability (while also 
underscoring technology’s inherent limitations).
Col. Finkel’s work is a compelling contribution to the existing lit-
erature on military innovation, and in his conclusion, he appropriately 
places his work among the major works in the subfield, “filling the gap” 
left by others who analyzed interwar and long-term innovation. Finkel’s 
work also nicely complements other very recent publications by Stanford 
Security Studies scholars Dima Adamsky, Eitan Shamir, and James 
Russell that deal with topics on military culture and innovation, mission 
command, and “bottom-up” learning.
In sum, On Flexibility is an interesting and challenging book which 
adds to the current conceptual thinking regarding militaries’ ability to 
recover from surprise and adapt, something that has been emphasized 
in various recent US and British military manuals, and will certainly 
continue to remain relevant in the future.
